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DOES THE GHOST OF LOCHNER HAUNT MISSION
SPRINGS? RUMINATIONS ON § 1983 DUE PROCESS
CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF MISSION SPRJNGS, INC. V. CITY
OF SPOKANE
Mark K. Funke
Abstract: The last time the Washington Supreme Court applied substantive due process in
a land use case was in Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane in 1998. Since then, the
Washington Law Review has published four commentaries that address substantive due
process in Washington land use, all of which characterize Washington's substantive due
process law as producing undesirable results. However, none of the available commentary
takes into consideration that there are two types of substantive due process cases in
Washington land use. In one type, courts strike down local ordinances, while in the other they
enforce the lawful application of ordinances by executive decisionmakers. This Comment
argues that the Washington Supreme Court should apply procedural due process analysis to
cases involving executive decisionmaking, such as Mission Springs, because these cases are
procedural in nature. This Comment also argues that commentators are misguided when they
compare the evils of Lochner-era substantive due process to executive decisionmaking cases.
Applying a procedural due process analysis would encourage beneficial outcomes, while
escaping the stigma associated with substantive due process.

The last time the Washington Supreme Court applied substantive due
process in a land use case was in 1998, when the court authored Mission
Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane.1 Mission Springs had received approval
from the Spokane hearing examiner for a planned unit development
(PUD) consisting of 790 apartment units.2 The hearing examiner issued a
favorable decision on November 25, 1991, and the city council gave final
approval for the project on August 31, 1992.? At that point, the
developer's legal right to build a PUD vested for five years.4 Two years
later, Mission Springs requested a grading permit for this development.'
Because the hearing examiner had approved the PUD in its entirety, the
grading permit was non-discretionary and the city should have issued it
immediately. However, the city council met and deliberated about
whether it should issue the permit.6 Mission Springs did not receive

1. 134 Wash. 2d 947,954 P.2d 250 (1998).
2. Id. at 952, 954 P.2d at 252.
3. Id. at 952-53,954 P.2d at 252.
4. Id. at 953, 954 P.2d at 252.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 954, 954 P.2d at 253.
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notice of this meeting and had no representative present.' At the meeting,
the council voted unanimously not to issue the permit and to investigate
the traffic impact of the proposal, even though the city attorney advised
the council that this would be a charter violation, a violation of the
applicant's vested rights, and a violation of due process.8 In response,
Mission Springs filed a complaint pursuant to section 64.40.020 of the
Revised Code of Washington9 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1° naming the City
of Spokane and the members of the city council and their spouses as
defendants." The Washington Supreme Court held that the actions of the
city council were arbitrary and violated substantive due process under
§ 1983.12 The court did not strike down a law or ordinance; rather, it
overturned the unlawful decision of the city council.13
This Comment argues that Mission Springs, and similar cases, rest on
procedural due process principles that the Washington Supreme Court
has inaccurately characterized as substantive due process. Procedural due
process is the correct legal doctrine in such cases, and the Washington
Supreme Court should apply it for two reasons: to remain intellectually
honest and to avoid unwarranted criticism from commentators.
Commentators decry the outcome of all Washington substantive due
process land use cases as a return to Lochner-era judicial excesses.
However, these commentators fail to recognize the procedural nature of
the Mission Springs line of cases, which have a beneficial outcome
because they enforce lawful conduct. To correct this mischaracterization,
the Washington Supreme Court should utilize procedural due process in
land use cases that involve the type of executive decisionmaking at issue
in Mission Springs.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 955, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.020 (2000) reads in part: "Owners of a property interest who have
filed an application for a permit have an action for damages to obtain relief from acts of an agency
which are arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or exceed lawful authority..
10. Section 1983 reads in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
11. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 957-58, 954 P.2d at 254-55.
12. Id. at 972, 954 P.2d at 262.
13. Id.

Ghost of Lochner
Part I of this Comment describes § 1983, the federal statute used to
bring due process claims, and traces federal limitations on claims against
local governments. Part II explains procedural due process and examines
the boundaries of bringing procedural claims within the context of
United States Supreme Court precedent. Part II also describes basic
principles of substantive due process and gives an overview of the
Lochner era. Part III discusses the parallel, but distinct, Washington
substantive due process law, starting with cases before Mission Springs,
then revisiting Mission Springs, and lastly giving a brief survey of
available commentary. Part IV encourages the Washington Supreme
Court to apply procedural due process analysis in those land use cases
that are similar to Mission Springs. This Comment concludes that, by
applying procedural due process in cases involving executive
decisionmaling, the Washington Supreme Court would utilize the proper
legal doctrine and quiet the fears of commentators.
I.

SECTION 1983, A TOOL FOR ENFORCING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, underlies all of Washington's
substantive due process doctrine and places important limitations on the
Washington Supreme Court. The statute serves as a tool for enforcing
constitutional rights, and parties have utilized it in all substantive due
process land use challenges brought before the Washington Supreme
Court in the last ten years. However, the United States Supreme Court
has imposed certain limitations in litigating § 1983 claims against local
governments.
When a government actor violates a person's constitutional rights,
§ 1983 allows the person to bring suit. 4 A cause of action will arise if the
defendant acted "under color of' state law and if the defendant's conduct
deprived the person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. 5 Section 1983 allows redress for government violations of
any part of the federal Constitution. 6 In the land use field, actions can be
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-88 (1965).
15. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-88.
16. See Steven Cushman, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: Toward a New Definition of
Municipal Policymaker, 34 B.C. L. REv. 693, 694-95 (1993). A cause of action for either a
constitutional violation or a violation of a federal law can be brought under § 1983.42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994). This Comment deals exclusively with constitutional claims and does not address
enforcement of federal statutes through § 1983.
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brought under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for taking of
property without just compensation and under the due process clause of
either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments for unconstitutional
deprivations of property.'7
Section 1983 is a "private attorney general statute" that encourages
individuals to seek vindication of constitutional rights through monetary
incentives. 8 These incentives include the recovery of punitive damages 9
and attorney's fees,2" as well as the right to a jury trial.' Comparable
state law remedies do not provide these economic motivations.' But
because of these incentives, the United States Supreme Court has been
careful to limit the usage of § 1983 against local governments for fear
that it would otherwise supplant state tort law.23
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,24 the Court found that
§ 1983 claims may be brought against local governments only when an
official policy or longstanding custom causes the constitutional
violation.' Monell involved an action brought by female employees of
17. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707-10 (1999)
(analyzing § 1983 takings claim); see also Eric Jenkins, Comment, Challenging Land Use Actions
Under Section 1983: Washington Law After Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 853, 856 (1999) (explaining how due process claims may be brought under § 1983). See
generally Richard H. Seamon, The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067
(2001) (discussing just compensation and the due process clause).
18. See Evans v. Jeff, 475 U.S. 717, 746 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing § 1983 as
"private attorney general" statute and explaining that attorney's fees are legal incentive designed to
foster § 1983 claims).
19. Punitive damages are not available in suits against the government. City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Generally, punitive damages are available against individual
public officers when certain tests are met. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34-37 (1983). However, the
government may indermnify an individual official. Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398, 399400 (9th Cir. 1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
21. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 710 (holding that Seventh Amendment grants jury trial to
determine if taking has occurred under Fifth Amendment). In City of Monterey, the appellants
sought damages under § 1983 and the Court held "that a § 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action
at law within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 708.
22. See, e-g., WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.020 (2000) (awarding only economic damages).
23. See generally Michael G. Collins, Symposium, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493 (1989) (discussing why limitations are
placed on § 1983 claims and discussing various problems with these limitations); see also Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
641, 693-94 (1987) (concluding from empirical data that constitutional tort litigation is well
constrained by law and not out of control).
24. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
25. Id. at 694.
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the City of New York who were required to take unpaid leaves of
absence while pregnant. 6 Without explanation, the Court conclusively
ruled that an official policy was involved, thereby allowing the § 1983
27
claim.
Three subsequent United States Supreme Court cases clarify what the
Monell Court meant by "official policy or longstanding custom." In
Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City,25 the Court ruled that a single random
constitutional violation by a low-level official does not establish
municipal liability and that, for liability to inure, the policymaker has to
select a course of action from multiple alternatives.' In Pembaurv. City
of Cincinnati,30 the Court established the "final authority doctrine."' The
Court stated that only persons with final authority could set policy. 32 In
3 3 the Court held that when the Tuttle and
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
Pembaurclarifications of the Monell test are not sufficient, courts should
look to state law to determine where policymaking power lies.34 Only if a
violation involves "official policy" as defined by these cases may a party
bring a § 1983 claim against local government. 31 This federal
requirement for claims against municipalities is an underlying limitation
placed on the Washington Supreme Court in interpreting § 1983 due
process claims.
II.

DUE PROCESS

The United States Supreme Court recognizes constitutional
protections for both procedural due process and substantive due process
26. Id. at 660-61.
27. Id. at 694.
28. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
29. Id. at 823-24.
30. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
31. Id. at 484-86; see also Cushman, supranote 16, at 705-06.
32. Pembaur,475 U.S. at 481-83.
33. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
34. Id. at 131.
35. There is considerable controversy regarding immunity of government actors in the context of
§ 1983 litigation. Generally, legislators and judges are absolutely immune, whereas a body or
individual acting in an administrative capacity is not absolutely immune, though planning and
zoning officials may enjoy qualified good faith immunity. See DANIEL MANDELKER Er AL,
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 187-89 (4th ed. 1995). The Mission Springs
court thoroughly discussed immunity, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. See
Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 969-70, 954 P.2d 250, 260-61 (1998).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:203, 2002

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.36 Both amendments dictate
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.37 Procedural due process requires a government to apply
its laws fairly, 35 while substantive due process requires that the laws
themselves are fair and reasonable.39
A.

ProceduralDue Process

Procedural due process guarantees fair procedures when a government
applies its laws to individuals." For example, procedural due process
requires that the state not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without a
fair trial, nor may a state take property without proper procedural
safeguards." There are multiple hurdles to bringing a procedural due
process claim. First, the text of the Constitution imposes constraints.
Then, courts must use a balancing test to determine the exact nature of
the procedure that is due. In addition, a government actor must cause the
deprivation in an adjudicative setting. Finally, if an adequate state
remedy exists for the violation, a three-factor test determines whether a
federal § 1983 claim can proceed.
1.

The Testfor Determininga Due Process Violation Derivesfrom the
Text of the Constitution

The test for determining a due process violation derives directly from
the text of the Constitution.42 The first phrase of each due process clause
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see also Edward Corwin, The Doctrine of Due
Process of Law Before the Civil War (pt. 1), 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372-73 (1911).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
38. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (holding that Wisconsin statute
that allowed, without hearing, public ridicule of individuals to whom liquor could not be sold
violated liberty under due process). The court observed that "it is procedure that marks much of the
difference between rule by law and rule by fiat." Id.
39. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 402-03 (6th ed.
2000).
40. See Corwin, supra note 36, at 368-70 (explaining that due process clauses were derived from
the Magna Carta with intent that they limit power and actions of government).
41. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. "We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any
of its provisions." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
277 (1856).
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describes the trio of protected interests: life, liberty, and property.4 3 The
second phrase describes the kind of protection provided, namely due
process of law.' Thus, if an interest does not constitute life, liberty, or
property, due process does not apply.45 If an interest does constitute an
element of life, liberty, or property, the government can deprive a person
of that interest, but, to be
constitutional, the deprivation must occur
46
process.
defined
a
through
The text of the Constitution does not define the terms of art used in
due process analysis, such as "deprivation," "defined process," and "life,
liberty, and property." Courts have therefore clarified the meaning of
such terms through judicial interpretation. Justice Frankfurter's 1951
description of procedural due process sheds light on the complexity of
the terms. He described procedural due process as a doctrine which has
evolved through the centuries, making it a "living principle not confined
to past instances." 7 He also thought that procedural due process
expresses "respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment
' The broad standards that
which has been evolved through centuries."48
Justice Frankfurter announced give courts leeway in the interpretation of
procedural due process.
2.

ProceduralProtectionAfforded to Property Is at Issue in
Washington s SubstantiveDue ProcessLand Use Law

In the context of Mission Springs and Washington due process land
use law, "property" is the protected interest at issue.49 State law defines
property for due process purposes," and that definition generally extends
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985).
Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,460 (1989).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951).

48. Id. at 162.
49. Mission Springs explicitly stated that the deprivation at issue was "property." Mission
Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 962, 954 P.2d 250, 257 (1998). Other
Washington cases also address an underlying property right, but never explicitly discuss it. See
generally, eg., Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997) (addressing
request for building permit when all decision criteria had been met); Lutheran Day Care v.
Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992) (discussing hearing examiner who
ignored conditional use permit criteria).
50. "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
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beyond the mere ownership of real estate or money.5' Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that to have a property interest,
a legitimate entitlement to it, not a mere "unilateral
one must have
52
expectation.

Once a court establishes that the government deprived a person of
property, the question remains whether the government used proper
process in executing the deprivation. The murkiness of due process law
arises from the fact that the Constitution does not describe the processes
that should be applied. 53 As a result, the "process that is due" is a courtmade doctrine that varies depending on which area of law is involved
and also varies among jurisdictions. 4 The United States Supreme Court
has announced a general three-factor test that attempts to balance the
private interest affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
private interest, and the government's burden in fulfilling procedural
requirements.5 This test enables courts to establish due process
requirements for every situation.
As the above test shows, the procedure due under the Constitution
depends on the circumstances. In the land use context, several
commentators have set forth a proposed list of procedural due process
requirements. 6 The Harvard Law Review noted that "procedural
requirements [in land use should] ... include the right to notice and a

hearing, and the right to an impartial decisionmaker which renders its

source such as state law." Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding

that non-tenured college professor did not have liberty interest in hearing before termination).
51. Id. at571-72.
52. Id. at 577.

53. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77
(1856).

54. "A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy
procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may
not suffice to try a felony charge." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (assessing whether state
may suspend driver's license without hearing). The United States Supreme Court has also stressed
that "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 442 (1960) (explaining that due process is undefinable because its content depends on specific
factual contexts).
55. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
56. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1523 (1978). See generally
James Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning
Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011 (1979) (giving overview of due process requirements
utilized in zoning cases).
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decision with reference to articulable standards.""7 For general
application, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
right to a hearing is a "fundamental requisite of due process law." 8 This
hearing must be held at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 9
Additionally, the right to a hearing is not useful without further
procedural requirements that establish a fair decisionmaking process."
Therefore, taking United States Supreme Court precedent into account,
commentators on land use have stressed the importance of neutral and
detached decisionmakers who explain their rulings and base their
decisions on clearly articulated standards and requirements.6
3.

ProceduralDue ProcessApplies to GovernmentalAdjudicatory
Functions

Procedural due process is applicable when state actors engage in
adjudicatory functions.62 However, the due process clause does not
impose procedural requirements when a decision is made in a legislative
capacity." The reason for this is that the legislative process allows for
input from the public and that input is deemed a proper safeguardf
Legislative acts are deemed to contain due process implicit in their
definition, whereas adjudicative functions do not contain the same
protections. 6 In the land use context, decisions are classified as either
judicial or legislative in nature, depending on the number of people
affected and state law presumptions. 6

57. Developments in the Law-Zoning, supranote 56, at 1502-03.
58. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
59. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965).
60. Developments in the Law-Zoning,supra note 56, at 1526.
61. Id. at 1524-28. See generally Kahn, supra note 56, at 1060 (concluding that courts should
"rigorously enforce" due process in zoning).
62. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441,445-46 (1915);
Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
63. See Bi-Metallic,239 U.S. at 445-46; Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86.
64. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("For protection against abuses by legislatures
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.").
65. See Bi-Metallic,239 U.S. at 445-46; Londoner,210 U.S. at 385-86.
66. The executive branch of local government makes land use decisions that are properly
classified as "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative." Thus, they are neither purely judicial nor purely
legislative. See, e.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 851-52, 613 P.2d 11480, 1153-54
(1980); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 461--64, 573 P.2d 359, 363-65 (1978)
(adopting what is known as "Fasano"position of quasi-judicial land use decisionmaking), aj'd on
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ProceduralProtectionsAre Available Even When an Adequate
State Remedy Exists

In the past, § 1983 procedural due process claims were not available
when an adequate state remedy existed. This rule originated in Parrattv.
Taylor,6 7 in which state prison officials negligently failed to follow
prison procedure and lost an inmate's hobby kit." The United States
Supreme Court agreed that the officials deprived the prisoner of
property; however, they did not extend federal jurisdiction over the due
process claim because state tort remedies provided a means of redress
that satisfied the requirements of procedural due process.69 The Court
justified this conclusion by stating that "the Fourteenth Amendment
protects only against deprivations 'without due process of law,"' 71 and
that, because state law allowed for a remedy, procedural due process was
satisfied.7 '
However, in Zinermon v. Burch,72 the United States Supreme Court
established a three-factor test for allowing procedural due process claims
even though an adequate state remedy exists.73 That case carves out an
exception to the Parrattholding.74 In Zinermon, the plaintiff sued on the
grounds that his admission to a state mental health hospital against his
will violated procedural due process.75 The Court held that the Parratt
bar is not absolute and allowed the § 1983 procedural due process claim
to go forward, even though a state remedy was available.76 The Court
decided that Parrattdid not control Zinermon because of the following
three factors: (1) the deprivation of liberty was predictable; (2) the
other grounds sub nom. Pleas v. Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 809-10, 774 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1989).
Land use decisions are quasi-judicial as long as their application is limited to a small group of
people. Id.
Fasano refers to Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, the decision that established
the concept of quasi-judicial zoning bodies. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or.
1973); see also Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839, 845 n.18 (1983).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981).
Id.at 529.
Id.at 543.
Id. at 537 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)).
Id.at 543.
494 U.S. 113 (1990).

73. Id.at 136-39.
74. Id. at 136.
75. Id.at 115.
76. Id. at 138-39.
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creation of pre-deprivation process was not impossible; and (3) the
deprivation was the result of an official's "abuse of his position" and
therefore was not "random and unauthorized." When all three factors are
met, a procedural due process claim will survive summary judgment
even when a comparable state remedy exists."
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the first Zinermon factor, whether a
deprivation is predictable, in Honey v. Distelrath.78 The court ruled that,
when decisionnakers are in a position with substantial discretionary
power and are responsible for the due process violation, "the deprivation
was foreseeable because it was their intent for it to occur., 79 The court
equated "foreseeable" with "predictable" and ruled that Honey's
deprivation of liberty was predictable and therefore met the first factor of
the Zinermon test.8" Intentional acts by those with discretionary power
may satisfy the first factor.
The Ninth Circuit further interpreted factor one in Armendariz v.
Penman.8 1 In that case, the city attorney, mayor, and planning directors
of San Bernardino, California, designed and implemented sweeps of lowincome housing units." These sweeps were deemed to be authorized and
predictable under the first Zinermon factor because the defendants were
those very people who had broad authority to interpret and enforce
housing and fire codes.83 The broad grant of authority, combined with
abuse of that authority, resulted in a deprivation that the Ninth Circuit
found "predictable."'
The second factor of the Zinermon test, that a pre-deprivation process
to prevent harm is not impossible, is not an issue when dealing with state
officials. As the Court saw it in Zinermon: "[I]t would indeed be strange
to allow state officials to escape § 1983 liability for failing to provide
constitutionally required procedural protections by assuming that those
procedures would be futile because the same state officials would find a

77. Id. at 136-39.
78. 195 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 534.
80. Id.
81. Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd in parton othergrounds, 75
F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 863.
83. Id. at 866.
84. Id.
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way to subvert them."85 Though the procedures in place in Zinermon
failed, the Court did not find that state officials would attempt to
circumvent all procedural protections. From the little guidance that the
United States Supreme Court has given, it appears that any case dealing
with state officials satisfies the second Zinermon factor.
The third Zinermon factor requires an "abuse of position" by a
government actor," which clarifies the previous United States Supreme
Court rulings in Hudson v Palmer87 and Daniels v. Williams.8 8 In
Hudson, the Court disallowed a procedural claim where government
actors intentionally deprived people of their rights.8 9 The Court reasoned
that the intentional conduct of the government officials was "random and
were
requirements
and
therefore
procedural
unauthorized"
"impracticable." 9 In Daniels, the Court found that procedural due
process is not violated if a government actor causes a deprivation
through negligence. 9' The Court found that negligent acts were
unpredictable and therefore impractical to procedurally safeguard. 92
Because Hudson barred procedural claims for intentional acts and
Daniels barred claims for negligent acts, it would seem that the United
States Supreme Court had foreclosed all procedural due process remedies
against the government. However, the third factor of the Zinermon test
expanded the procedural due process doctrine and clarified that a party
may bring a procedural claim when there is an "abuse of position."93
Zinermon demonstrated that a government official's "abuse of position"
is not the same as a "random and unauthorized" act.94
B.

Substantive Due Process

The general principle of substantive due process is that the doctrine is
not concerned with procedural protections, but rather requires that the

85. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137-38 (1990).
86. Id. at 138.
87. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
88. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
89. Id. at 335-36; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
90. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
91. Daniels,474 U.S. at 332-33.
92. Id.
93. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138 (1990).
94. Id. at 136.
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underlying law be fair and reasonable.95 Thus, an adequate justification
must exist for every law aside from procedural precautions. For example,
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.96 was the first constitutional challenge to
zoning to reach the United States Supreme Court. The issue presented
was whether the property owner was deprived of property by
unreasonable and confiscatory means.9 7 The zoning ordinance withstood
the substantive due process inquiry, and thereby initiated the land use
system that exists today.9" The Court announced that to be
unconstitutional, land use regulations must be "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."99 However, this test is only one of several
methods for applying substantive due process.'
Courts have produced a wide variety of tests that make it difficult to
predict violations of substantive due process. The Lochner era illustrates
the problems that can result from such vague standards. In that period,
the United States Supreme Court broadly construed substantive due
process, and utilized it to strike down legislation at whim. Many
commentators have criticized substantive due process because of the
Lochner era.
Courts Have Produceda PlethoraofSubstantive Due Process
Theories and Tests

1.

Due to the sheer multitude of theories and general confusion in the
area of substantive due process, it is not possible to isolate a single
coherent legal standard.' The particular wording of the test to determine
whether a law is substantively defective depends on the court, the circuit,
and the subject matter." Inthe land use context, the federal courts use a
95. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supranote 39, at 402-03.
96.
97.
98.
RICH.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at386.
See Richard Haar, Symposium, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls:A ParadigmShift?, 30 U.
L. REV. 1011, 1011-14 (1996).

99. See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 917, 927 (1999) (citing Euclid,272 U.S. at 395) (emphasis omitted).
100. See infra Part II.B.1.
101. In regard to substantive due process inland use, "the Supreme Court... has never laid dovn
definitive standards of review." Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1217 (6th Cir.
1992). Pearson also elucidates the substantive due process standard for each federal circuit,
concluding that each is developing its
own doctrine. See id. at 1217-19.
102. See id.; see also Jenkins, supranote 17, at 857--64.
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variety of standards. °3 The Ninth and Second Circuits narrowly tailor the
definition of property rights to exclude such items as development
rights.' The First Circuit finds a substantive violation only if the
infringement of due process is "shocking or violative of universal
standards of decency."' 0 5 The Seventh Circuit refuses to extend
substantive due process violations to land use unless a decision is
"irrational.' 0 6 The remaining circuits find that land use decisions do not
violate the Constitution unless they are "shocking to the conscience" or
"truly irrational."' 17 Unlike the federal circuits, in Washington, the state
supreme court invoked the "arbitrary interference" standard for
determining whether a due process violation had occurred.'0 8
In addition, substantive due process tests change depending on the
area of law involved.' 0 9 In the 1930s, the courts decreed that economic
interests warranted a different level of scrutiny than liberty interests."0
Now courts often evaluate property and economic interests, such as the
freedom to contract, under the rational basis test, which presumes that a
law affecting commercial transactions is valid if it rests upon a rational

103. See Jenkins, supra note 17, at 857-63.
104. See id. at 858-59. In Mission Springs, Justice Talmadge argued that the Ninth Circuit no
longer recognizes substantive due process and therefore Washington courts should not recognize
substantive due process. Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 990, 954 P.2d
250, 271 (1998) (Talmadge, J., dissenting). However, the case that Justice Talmadge cites as
vanquishing substantive due process did allow a procedural due process claim. Armendariz v.
Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.
1996).
105. Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748,757 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted).
106. See Consiton Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461,467 (7th Cir. 1988).
107. See Pearson,961 F.2d at 1221 (noting that "arbitrary and capricious" in constitutional sense
has entirely different meaning than in state administrative law context); G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs. v.
W. Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990); Jenkins, supra note 17, at 857.
108. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 964, 954 P.2d at 258. Whether Washington uses only the
arbitrary interference test is unclear. Justice Talmadge, in his Mission Springs dissent, reminds the
majority that it forgot to apply Washington's substantive due process balancing test. See id. at 98788, 954 P.2d at 270 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). This test asks (1) whether the regulation has a public
purpose; (2) whether it uses reasonable means to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly
oppressive on the property owner. Id.; see also Susan Boyd, Comment, A DoctrineAdrift: Land Use
Regulation and the Substantive Due Process of Lawton v. Steele in the Supreme Court of
Washington, 74 WASH. L. REV. 69, 70 (1999).
109. See Phillips, supra note 99, at 923-49 (describing application of substantive due process in
several different fields).
110. See id. (explaining how substantive due process applied to economic deprivations has been
severely limited since 1930s, whereas courts continue to afford more substantive due process
protections to liberty interests).
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basis within the knowledge and experience of legislators."' In some of
the federal courts there has been a resurgence of economic substantive
due process in which the courts apply the previously mentioned
standards." 2 However, modem courts mostly apply substantive due
process law in those cases dealing with personal liberties, such as the
right to an abortion." 3 Due to the multitude of tests and lack of any
coherent federal standard, individual courts have developed their own
substantive due process tests." 4
2.

The Lochner Era Was a Misapplicationof Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process is commonly associated with courts striking
down laws." 5 The period in which such invalidation routinely took place
is known as the "Lochnerera.""' 6 During the Lochner era, from the 1890s
through the 1930s, the United States Supreme Court struck down
legislation that inhibited freedom of contract and other economic rights
under the guise of due process." 7 The Court defined the freedom to
contract as an inherent right within "liberty and property," protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' This definition
enabled the United States Supreme Court to strike down progressive
laws, such as minimum wage regulations for women.' 9 The justices
invalidated legislation at will, thereby arguably violating the fundamental
constitutional separation of powers. 20 Over the course of forty years, the
Lochner Court invalidated approximately 200 laws.'

111. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
112. See Phillips, supra note 99, at 925-27.
113. See id. at 925-26.
114. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Jenkins,
supranote 17, at 863-71.
115. See Phillips, supranote 99, at 920-21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 924.
119. See Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923).
120. See Phillips, supranote 99, at 922. Many cases typify the Lochner era. See, eg., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (overturning law that restricted number of hours bakers could
work); see also Adkins, 261 U.S. at 549 (striking down minimum wage laws for women); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) (striking down federal law that prohibited railroad
workers from joining unions).
121. See Phillips, supranote 99, at 921.
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Numerous scholars and justices have decried the days of Lochner, and
local commentators have expressed fear about its continued presence in
and influence on Washington law.12 One commentator described the era
as "shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of subjective
judicial activism."'' 2 In Washington, after Mission Springs allowed a
§ 1983 land use action to go forward, Justice Talmadge made blanket
accusations that the Washington Supreme Court had returned to the
Lochner era of due process interpretation. 24 He stated that "[tihe
property-rights
of modern-day
views
driven
ideologically
advocates.., would effectively undercut the police power by elevating
policy disputes to constitutional dimensions.... They would turn back
the clock to the days of Lochner v. New York."'2 5 Justice Talmadge also
opined that "[substantive due process] finds its most extreme expression
in Washington land use cases, involving a formulation that virtually
encourages the judiciary to legislate without restraint any time it
disagrees with a legislative enactment."'126 Thus, in Washington, and in
general, substantive due process receives much criticism.
III.

WASHINGTON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LAW

The Washington Supreme Court has relied exclusively upon
substantive due process in deciding § 1983 land use cases that preceded
Mission Springs. However, there are in fact two distinct types of cases in
this context. One type deals with the invalidation of a statute or
ordinance itself, while the other involves overturning an executive
decision. Mission Springs falls into the line of cases in which the court
overturned an executive decision. Since the court decided Mission
Springs, four commentators have criticized Washington's use of
substantive due process in land use cases.
122. Michael J. Phillips collected quotes on the Lochner era from numerous scholars and justices.
Among them are Justice Rehnquist, who stated that during the Lochner era "[it] was common
practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a state." Id. (internal citations
omitted). Robert Bork called the accusation of Lochner-ism "the ultimate malediction of legal
debate," while Justice Souter has remarked on the "disastrous mistakes" of the Lochner era. Id.
(internal citations omitted).
123. Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
StatesSupreme Court,1881-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249,250 (1987).
124. See generally Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern
Government: The Interaction ofPolice Power and PropertyRights, 75 WASH L. REV. 857 (2000).
125. Id. at 858.
126. Id. at 895.
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A.

Before Mission Springs, the Washington Supreme CourtApplied
Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis to Two Types of Cases

Washington substantive due process law has developed along two
lines of cases. One deals with a traditional form of substantive due
process, where the Washington Supreme Court has invalidated laws
because they were arbitrary and capricious. The other deals with failure
by administrative and executive personnel to follow local ordinances in
executive decisionmaking ("executive decisionmaking cases"). The
traditional form of substantive due process is found in Sintra,Inc. v. City
of Seattle,127 while an example of executive decisionmaking is found in
Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County.' The Washington Supreme
Court decided both of these cases on May 14, 1992, emphasizing the
disparate development of Washington's substantive due process law."'
In a 1997 case involving executive decisionmaking, Justice Talmadge
recognized that these cases were procedural in nature and that procedural
rather than substantive due process should apply.
1.

Sintra IllustratesSubstantive Due Process Cases in Which the
Washington Supreme CourtStruck Down an Ordinance

Sintra exemplifies the type of traditional substantive due process land
use case where the court strikes down an ordinance or law. In Sintra, the
appellant owned a hotel that was not profitable because of an adult
entertainment business located next door. 130 Therefore, Sintra desired to
convert the hotel into a mini-storage business.' 3' Under authority of a
Housing Preservation Ordinance (HPO), 32 the city informed Sintra that it
would require $219,480 as a change of use fee. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the I-PO violated substantive due process; the
court also struck down the ordinance and allowed Sintra's § 1983 claim

127. 119 Wash. 2d 1,829 P.2d 765 (1992).
128. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992).
129. See Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765; Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d
746.
130. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at6, 829 P.2d at 768.
131. Id. at7, 829 P.2d at 768.
132. The HPO required developers to replace low-income housing that they destroyed, or to pay a
fee into a housing replacement fund. Id. at 11 n.1, 829 P.2d at 768 n.1.
133. Id. at 8, 829 P.2d at 768.
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to progress.' 4 The court stated that the federal due process clause "isa
limit on a state's ability to pass unreasonable or irrational laws which
deprive individuals of property rights.' 3 5 Sintra thus represents
substantive due process cases in which the court struck down an
ordinance. In all there are five Washington Supreme Court decisions
dealing with
this type of substantive due process in the land use
36
context. 1
2.

Lutheran Day Care IllustratesSubstantive Due Process Cases in
Which the Washington Supreme Court Overturned a Land Use
Decision Rather Than Invalidatedan Ordinance

In contrast to Sintra stands Lutheran Day Care, which represents
substantive due process cases that consider the validity of an executive
decision. Both the Snohomish County hearing examiner and the county
council denied the appellant, Lutheran Day Care, a conditional use
permit (CUP) to build a rest home on its property.'37 Lutheran Day Care
appealed that decision to the Superior Court, which found no factual
basis for the hearing examiner's conclusions and remanded the CUP to
the examiner.'38 Without holding a new hearing, the examiner filed
supplemental findings and conclusions denying the request.'39 The
Washington Supreme Court deemed this subsequent action by the
examiner unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious; however, the court
found that the examiner did not invalidate any ordinance or law. 4 ' The
court allowed a substantive due process § 1983 claim because the
hearing examiner had unlawfully rendered his decision without

134. Id. at 29, 829 P.2d at 780-81.
135. Id. at 21, 829 P.2d at 776 (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320,
330,787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990)); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S- 133, 142-43 (1894).
136. See Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 650, 854 P.2d 23, 37 (1993)
(holding that registration fee ordinance did not violate substantive due process); Guimont v. Clarke,
121 Wash. 2d 586, 613, 854 P.2d 1, 16 (1993) (invalidating mobile home relocation law); Sintra,
119 Wash. 2d at 29, 829 P.2d at 780-81; Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 54, 830 P.2d
318, 330 (1992) (invalidating another version of HPO discussed in Sintra); W. Main Assocs. v. City
of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 53, 720 P.2d 782, 786 (1986) (striking down Bellevue land use
ordinance).
137. Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91,96, 829 P.2d 746,748 (1992).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 97, 829 P.2d at 748.
140. Id.
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In all there are four
considering or applying local ordinances.'
Washington Supreme Court cases of this type that considered
overturning an executive land use decision. 42
In Lutheran Day Care,the court also held that § 1983 claims are only
permissible when a government actor makes a deliberate choice to follow
a course of action from various alternatives.'43 Washington follows
United States Supreme Court precedent in § 1983 threshold
determination. The state high court used Pembaurto guide its definition
of the word "policy," as used in the Monell test, and found that in
Washington, "[section] 1983 attaches where-and only where-a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among
various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question."'"
Having established this test, the court found that the Snohomish County
Council, which had ratified the hearing examiner's decision, was a final
policymaking body.'45 The court held that because the appellant had
satisfied the prerequisites of a § 1983 claim, it was entitled to relief."46 In
47 Washington looks to state law to
accordance with Praprotnik,'
determine where policy making power lies when Tuttle and Pembaur do
not provide sufficient guidance.' 48
3.

In Hayes v. City of Seattle, a DissentingJusticeRecognized the
ProceduralNature of the Case

In Hayes v. City of Seattle,'49 another executive decisionmaking case,
the Washington Supreme Court failed to apply § 1983 substantive due
141. Id. at 125, 829 P.2d at 763.
142. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 972, 954 P.2d 250, 262
(1998); Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 717, 934 P.2d 1179, 1185 (1997) (holding that
city council arbitrarily imposed building regulations); Christianson v. Snohomish Health Dist., 133
Wash. 2d 647, 667, 964 P.2d 768, 777 (1997) (holding that hearing examiner's decision followed
local regulations and was not violation of substantive due process); Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wash.
2d at 97, 829 P.2d at 748.
143. LutheranDay Care, 119 Wash. 2d at 120-21, 829 P.2d at 760-61 (citing Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,483-84 (1986)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 121,829 P.2d at 761.
146. Id. at 128, 829 P.2d at 764.
147. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
148. See id. at 126-27, 829 P.2d at 763-64; see supranotes 25-34 and accompanying text.
149. 131 Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997).
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process because there was a state law claim. 50 In Hayes, the appellant
applied to the Seattle Department of Construction and Land Use (DCLU)
for a master use permit to replace a single-family home with a threestory, mixed-use apartment building with a footprint 80 feet long and 40
feet wide.' DCLU and the Seattle City Council approved the permit,
subject to the condition that the building be no more than 65 feet in
length, without any explanation for the restriction." 2 In fact, the project
met or exceeded all land use code regulations.'53 Thus, Hayes
commenced action seeking damages, costs, and attorney's fees pursuant
to section 64.40.020 of the Revised Code of Washington and § 1983.'
The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the city council had
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by imposing a condition
without justification.' However, the court declined to render judgment
on the § 1983 claim because it determined that Hayes could recover
under state law.'56
In his dissent, Justice Talmadge criticized the Hayes majority for not
adequately addressing the issue of due process in the context of § 1983,
stating that "[b]y declining to address... substantive due process and 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the majority also leaves in place an erroneous analysis of
the constitutional tort in land use cases, contributing to further confusion
in an area of law already made nearly unintelligible."' 5 7 With these
words, Justice Talmadge challenged the court to clarify § 1983 due
process law. Mission Springs was the court's response."'
Talmadge's dissent in Hayes is the only opinion in which a
Washington Supreme Court justice distinguished between procedural and
substantive due process violations in a § 1983 land use case.'59 Talmadge
clearly stated that Hayes, a case involving executive decisionmaking, is a

150. Id. at 718,934 P.2d at 1185.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 709,934 P.2d at 1180.
Id.
Id. at709 n.1, 934 P.2d at 1180 n.1.
Id. at 710, 934 P.2d at 1181.
Id. at 717, 934 P.2d at 1185.

156. Id. at 718, 934 P.2d at 1185.
157. Id. at 724,934 P.2d at 1188 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
158. Following the Hayes court's rejection of the § 1983 claim, Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of
Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954 P.2d 250 (1998), was the next time the Washington Supreme Court
allowed a § 1983 substantive due process claim in land use.
159. Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 737, 934 P.2d at 1194 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
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procedural, not substantive, due process case.160 Relying on Parratt,He
also stated that "if the challenged action was a violation of procedural
due process, there is no deprivation of a constitutional right if state law
provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy."' 16' Thus, Talmadge
believed that Hayes had a procedural claim, but that the claim could not
be heard because of Parratt.
B.

Mission Springs Revisited

Following Lutheran Day Care, Sintra, and Hayes, Mission Springs
was the most recent decision in which the Washington Supreme Court
applied substantive due process in the land use context. In Mission
Springs, a developer had a vested right to build a 790 unit PUD.162 After
the right vested, the Spokane City Council voted unanimously not to
issue a non-discretionary grading permit, even though the city attorney
advised the council that this would be a violation of Mission Springs'
vested rights and due process rights. 6 ' In response, Mission Springs filed
a complaint alleging both a violation of state land use law and a § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment due process deprivation.'" The Washington
Supreme Court found that the city council had no authority to act on the
permit and that it acted contrary to law when it interfered in the issuance
of the permit.' Furthermore, the court stated that the developer had a
property right under state law, noting that "development rights are
beyond question a valuable right in property. '' 16' Having made these
findings, the court held that the city council's decision was invalid under
substantive due process, but the court did not strike down any
ordinances. 67

160. Id.
161. Id. at 743, 934 P.2d at 1198 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
162. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 952, 954 P.2d at 252.
163. Id. at 955, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
164. Id. at 961-63, 954 P.2d at 257.
165. Id. at 972, 954 P.2d at 262.
166. Id. at 963, 954 P.2d at 257.
167. Id. at 966-67, 954 P.2d at 259.
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The Mission Springs Court Stated That ProceduralRights Were at
Issue

The Mission Springs court announced that a procedural violation had
occurred. The majority stated that "proceduralrights respecting permit
issuance create property rights"1 68 and that "[c]ity council members who
improperly interfere with the process by which a municipality issues
permits deprive the permit applicant of his property absent that process
which is due."' 69 The court also stated "[n]or do we here consider a delay
occasioned by foot dragging or inefficiency. Rather this claim puts at
issue a purposeful abrogation of mandatory process which would
otherwise result in permit issuance.""'7 The council had failed to follow
city code provisions that precluded it from interfering in the ministerial
act of issuing the grading permit. Thus, the council failed to give Mission
Springs the procedural process it was due.
2.

The Mission Springs Court Concluded That It Was Barred by Ninth
CircuitPrecedentfrom Invoking ProceduralDue Process

Despite the court's recognition of the procedural nature of the
council's violation, it felt compelled by a Ninth Circuit case, Bateson v.
Geisse,'7 ' to apply a substantive rather than procedural due process
analysis. 72 In Bateson, a contractor submitted a building permit
application to the city of Billings, Montana, that facially complied with
all ordinance requirements.' 73 The city council then intentionally initiated
a zoning amendment to prevent Bateson from obtaining his permit. 74
Bateson alleged both substantive and procedural due process claims
under § 1983.' 75 The Ninth Circuit dismissed his procedural claim
because of the lack of significant substantive restrictions on the city
council's powers. 76 Under Montana law, Bateson did not have an
entitlement or property interest in the permit. Instead of allowing the
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 963, 954 P.2d at 257 (emphasis added).
Id. at 965, 954 P.2d at 258 (emphasis added).
Id. at 966, 954 P.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).

172. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 966, 954 P.2d at 259.
173. Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1302.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1303, 1305.
176. Id. at 1305.
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procedural claim, the court found the violation to be so egregious as to
constitute an arbitrary and capricious decision that violated substantive
due process.177 In Mission Springs, the court announced that federal
precedent controls the application of federal law when there are similar
facts. 178 The court proceeded to follow Bateson.179 As a consequence, in
Washington, when administrative or executive personnel fail to observe
legal entitlements in executive decisionmaking and plaintiffs invoke
procedural due process under § 1983, courts will dismiss the claim and
the only recourse will be substantive due process.
C.

Since Mission Springs, FourWashington Law Review Publications
Have Criticized Washington s SubstantiveDue ProcessDoctrine

Four commentaries published by the Washington Law Review since
the Mission Springs decision all portray Washington's entire substantive
due process doctrine in a negative light. Professor Hugh Spitzer's article
focuses on Washington police powers and characterizes the emergence
of substantive due process as peculiar. 8 ' Eric Jenkins' Note on Mission
Springs argues that the failure of the court to adopt a strict § 1983 due
Jenkins
process test results in a broad and confused standard.'
especially laments the broad range of conduct that will subject
Susan Boyd
government actors to substantive due process suits.'
explains in her Comment that the Washington Supreme Court applies
substantive due process in a fashion that inappropriately permits courts to
become policymaking bodies. 3 Lastly, Justice Talmadge's article
vehemently attacks Washington's substantive due process doctrine as an
"extreme interpretation" without authority in federal law.'84 He also
177. Id. at 1303-04.
178. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 968, 954 P.2d at 260.
179. Id. at 366, 954 P.2d at 259. However, this is an odd result because the Washington Supreme
Court announced early on that it would not be bound by the decisions of any federal court except the
United States Supreme Court. Noble v. Dibble, 119 Wash. 509, 511,205 P. 1049, 1049 (1922). The
Washington Supreme Court has held that the opinions of circuit courts deciding issues of federal law
are highly persuasive and not mandatory. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. N. Pac. Ry., 18 Wash. 2d 798,
808, 140 P.2d 507, 511 (1943).
180. Hugh Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REv. 495, 511
(2000).
181. See Jenkins, supranote 17, at 870.
182. Id.
183. See Boyd, supra note 108, at 92.
184. Talmadge, supranote 124, at 901.
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explicitly warns that Washington is returning to the Lochner era of
judicial excesses.' Justice Talmadge concludes that the substantive due
process doctrine should be reined in so that community interests in
property triumph over individualistic notions of property rights.'86 None
of the four commentaries mention the distinction between the two lines
of substantive due process cases.187 Rather, Washington's substantive due
process law is categorically characterized as having an undesirable and
unjust effect.
IV. WASHINGTON CASES INVOLVING DUE PROCESS
CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE DECISIONMAKING
SHOULD BE DECIDED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
The Washington Supreme Court should decide cases that are similar
to Mission Springs on procedural grounds. There are two types of due
process land use cases in Washington. Executive decisionmaking cases
are procedural, and, contrary to the court's perception, federal precedent
does not bar the application of procedural due process analysis. The
Washington Supreme Court must recognize these procedural cases for
what they are and apply the correct legal reasoning. Using procedural
due process in these types of cases does not threaten a return to the
Lochner era. Rather, these cases result in the beneficial enforcement of
existing laws. Utilization of the proper legal doctrine would remove any
Lochner stigma from Washington land use law.
A.

The Washington Supreme CourtShould Use a ProceduralDue
ProcessAnalysis in Executive Decisionmaking Cases Because They
Are Proceduralin Nature

The Washington Supreme Court has mixed procedural due process
with substantive due process. The court should disentangle the two types
of cases by applying procedural due process in cases involving executive
decisionmaking. Though the court feels barred by federal precedent,
Bateson and Parrattdo not prevent a procedural due process claim in
cases similar to Mission Springs.

185. Id. at 894-901.
186. Id. at 908.
187. See generally Spitzer, supra note 180; Talmadge, supra note 124; Boyd, supra note 108;
Jenkins, supra note 17.
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1.

There Are Two Intertwined Types of Due Process Cases in
Washington Land Use

As shown earlier, Washington's substantive due process case law in
land use consists of two separate types of cases.""' In one type, as in the
Lochner era, the court has evaluated the constitutionality of a particular
law or ordinance.18 9 If the facts met a particular due process test, such as
the arbitrary or capricious standard, the court struck down the law or
ordinance. 9 ' In contrast stands Washington's other line of substantive
due process cases, in which the Washington Supreme Court has used
substantive due process to attack the unlawful implementation of land
use regulations without invalidating legislation in a Lochner-esque
fashion. 9' Both Lutheran Day Care and Mission Springs fall into the line
of executive decisionmaking cases because they deal with the problem of
executive decisionmakers who refuse to follow existing land use
regulations.
2.

Executive DecisionmakingCases Are Proceduralin Nature

The Washington Supreme Court should recognize executive
decisionmaking cases for what they are and apply procedural due process
as a proper cause of action. Because these cases are procedural in nature,
as the court itself recognized in Mission Springs, procedural due process
is the correct form of legal analysis.
Mission Springs illustrates how cases involving executive
decisionmaking are procedural in nature. First, the facts of Mission
Springs meet all the requirements of a procedural due process claim. The
city council deprived the land use applicant of a protected due process
interest, namely property, because the court held that the vested right to
build was a property right under state law. 9 Because a city council is an
arm of government, the government actor requirement was satisfied.'
Additionally, the city council made its decision in an adjudicative

188. See supra Part III.A.
189. See supra Parts HLI.A, B.2.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part HLI.A.2.
Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947,964,954 P.2d 250,258 (1998).
See supra Part II.A.3.
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capacity.'94 The city council also failed to give Mission Springs the
process it was due because the developer did not receive notice of the
' Lastly, the council did not follow local ordinances, though
meeting. 95
'
the city attorney had clearly articulated them. 96
Second, in Mission Springs the court did not evaluate whether an
underlying law or ordinance was just, as is done in a traditional
substantive due process analysis. 9 7 The Mission Springs court did not
reach that question because the council ignored its own local code,'98 and
the court therefore overturned the unlawful decision of the city
council.' 99 Thus, Mission Springs and other executive decisionmaking
cases do not conform to a traditional notion of substantive due process.
Third, the court itself stated that procedural due process was at issue.
In Mission Springs, the majority acknowledged that the issue was a
procedural one, stating the claim "puts at issue a purposeful abrogation
of mandatoryprocess."2' ° Additionally, Justice Talmadge clearly stated
that Hayes, another executive decisionmaking case, involved procedural
due process and not substantive due process.20 ' Thus, the court has
recognized that executive decisionmaking cases revolve around
procedural due process, yet it has not applied that analysis.
Fourth, the Washington Supreme Court may have rested its opinion in
Mission Springs on substantive due process grounds because it felt that
federal precedent barred the use of procedural due process. The court
stated that it was bound by Bateson and chose to apply substantive due
process-and not procedural due process-when confronted with a

194. Washington has held zoning decisions to be quasi-judicial. See Parkridge v. City of Seattle,
89 Wash. 2d 454, 463-64, 537 P.2d 359, 365 (1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Pleas v.
Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 809-10, 774 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1989). Because Mission Springs' planned
unit development was for the benefit of one applicant and had an impact on a limited number of
people, the council's decision was judicial in nature. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
195. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 954, 954 P.2d at 253.
196. Id. at 955, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
197. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 402-03; see supra notes 95-99 and
accompanying text.
198. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 955, 954 P.2d at 253-54.
199. Id. at 972, 954 P.2d at 262.
200. Id. at 966, 954 P.2d at 259 (emphasis added). This is only one of the many instances in
which the court described Mission Springs as involving procedural problems. See infra Part III.B.I.
201. Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 737, 934 P.2d 1179, 1194 (1997) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
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similar fact pattern." Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Talmadge was
reluctant to allow procedural due process claims because of Parratt,a
United States Supreme Court case that did not allow a procedural due
process claim when there was an adequate state remedy. 20 3 However, as
the following section discusses, executive decisionmaking cases are
distinguishable from Bateson and Parratt,and thus there is no bar to the
Washington Supreme Court's use of procedural due process.
3.

FederalPrecedentDoes Not Bar the Washington Supreme Court
from Applying ProceduralDue ProcessAnalysis in Executive
DecisionmakingCases

Washington State is not compelled to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Bateson. Bateson is distinguishable from Mission Springs
because Bateson had no reasonable expectation of receiving a
subdivision plat."' The court's denial of Bateson's procedural due
process claim rests on the fact that he did not have an entitlement to
approval of his plat. 5 Mission Springs, in contrast, states that the
developer had a recognizable property interest in his vested building
application.0 6 Consequently, Mission Springs had a legitimate claim of
entitlement for development of its PUD. What defines property is a
question of state law, and in Mission Springs, the Washington Supreme
Court found that a property right existed in a vested grading permit."0 7
The developer in Mission Springs had a property right that gave it an
expectation and entitlement that the city council could not interfere with;
Bateson had no such right.
The facts of Bateson and Mission Springs may seem similar, but the
underlying assumptions of state law must come from Washington State
and not from the Ninth Circuit adjudicating a Montana case. For
example, the fact that Bateson did not have a property right in the permit
issuance is a matter of state law."' Also, the degree of discretion granted
202. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 968, 954 P.2d at 260; see also supra notes 171-179 and
accompanying text.
203. Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 743, 934 P.2d at 1198 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
204. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1988).
205. Id.
206. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 965, 954 P.2d at 258.
207. Id.; see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
208. See Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also supra notes
49-52 and accompanying text.
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to a land use decisionmaking body is a matter of state law.2" 9 In general,
courts construe zoning principles under state law. 210 As a result, the
Washington Supreme Court can easily distinguish Bateson because
Washington law redefines the underlying assumptions.
Additionally, Parratt does not prohibit Washington courts from
applying procedural due process in executive decisionmaking cases.
Justice Talmadge incorrectly propagates the theory that Parrattbars
Washington from utilizing procedural due process when an adequate
state remedy exists. Justice Talmadge, in his Hayes dissent, stated that as
soon as a party invokes procedural due process, a § 1983 claim can only
be raised if there is no proper state redress. 21 ' For example, in Mission
Springs, the plaintiff alleged violations under both section 64.40.020 of
the Revised Code of Washington and § 1983.212 If the court had
recognized the city council action as a procedural violation, it would
likely have dismissed the § 1983 claim, reasoning that procedural justice
is done whenever there is an alternate state-law method of pursuing the
claim.1 3 However, a close examination of United States Supreme Court
precedent indicates that the Washington courts would not have to dismiss
the § 1983 claim.
By applying the Zinermon test to the facts of Mission Springs, one
sees that the Washington Supreme Court could have allowed a
procedural claim.1 4 The Spokane city council had great discretionary
power.215 The city attorney warned the council members of their
imminent constitutional violation,2 6 and therefore the court could have
209. See supranotes 49-52 and accompanying text.
210. See supranotes 49-52 and accompanying text.
211. Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 706, 743, 934 P.2d 1179, 1197 (1997) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
212. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 951, 954 P.2d at 252.
213. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981). Section 64.40.020 of the Revised Code of
Washington provides a land use applicant a cause of action for arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful
decisions similar to § 1983 substantive due process claims. Justice Talmadge argued that
§ 64.40.020 was an adequate state remedy under Parratt,but he never analyzed the procedural
adequacy of the statute. See Hayes, 131 Wash. 2d at 724-46, 934 P.2d at 1188-99 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
214. The three Zinermon factors ask whether (1) the deprivation of liberty was predictable; (2) the
creation of pre-deprivation process was not impossible; and (3) the deprivation was the result of an
official's abuse of position. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136-39 (1990).
215. The city council voted unanimously not to issue the grading permit after the city attorney
informed them that their action would be a violation of due process. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d
at 957, 954 P.2d at 254.
216. Id.
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concluded that it was the council's intent that this deprivation occur. The
2 17
court could have found, as the Ninth Circuit did in Honey v. Distelrath,
that the council acted in a "deliberate, considered, planned" manner.2" 8
Additionally, following the reasoning of Zinermon, pre-deprivation
process was not impossible. 2 9 Lastly, the court would have to have
found that the council abused its position. This is not a difficult
conclusion, since the court determined that the council's decision was an
arbitrary interference." Thus, all three factors of the Zinermon test could
have been met in Mission Springs. Although Zinermon has never been
applied in Washington land use, application of the three-factor test is
reasonable. Its application would allow the court to remain intellectually
honest by applying the proper legal doctrine-procedural due processto executive decisionmaking cases.
B.

The Washington Supreme Court Should Use a ProceduralDue
ProcessAnalysis in Executive DecisionmakingCases To Enforce
Lawful Conduct and Avoid the Stigma ofLochner

By defining a misapplication of local land use code as substantive due
process, the Washington Supreme Court has opened the door to the
criticism that it is returning to the Lochner era. Lochner embodies the
traditional form of substantive due process and is not associated with
procedural due process."21 Although commentators label all of
Washington substantive due process law as undesirable and Lochner-ian,
both the Washington Supreme Court and legal commentators have failed
to differentiate executive decisionmaking cases as procedural in
nature m Despite these assertions by commentators, Washington courts
are not experiencing a return to Lochner with cases such as Mission
Springs for two reasons. First, in executive decisionmaking cases the
courts enforce lawful conduct rather than striking down laws. Second,
federal § 1983 limitations, specifically Monell v. Department of Social
Services,' prohibit § 1983 from replacing state tort claims and thus limit

217. 195 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1999).
218. Id. at 534.
219. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 137-38.
220. Mission Springs, 134 'Wash. 2d at 970,954 P.2d at 261.
221. See supranotes 115-121 and accompanying text.
222. See supranotes 124-126 and accompanying text.
223. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
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the application of this constitutional tort. Procedural due process may be
open to other criticism, but it is the proper doctrine to apply in executive
decisionmaking cases.
1.

Executive DecisionmakingCases Are Beneficial and Not a Return
to Lochner Because the CourtIs EnforcingLaws, Not Striking
Them Down

Requiring that procedural due process be followed in executive
decisionmaking cases upholds legal entitlements and therefore does not
threaten a return to Lochner. 4 The Lochner era is characterized by
courts striking down laws arbitrarily. Mission Springs does not bring
with it this problem, but rather brings the benefit of a land use process
that requires final decisionmakers to follow local regulations. Using due
process to require the lawful application of laws and ordinances is
different and more beneficial than Lochner era invalidation of laws and
ordinances. This is true because, when the courts apply procedural due
process, they are holding local governments accountable to their own
regulations.
2.

Courts Are Preventedby § 1983 Law from Returning to Excessive
JudicialActivism in Executive Decisionmaking Cases

Federal limitations on bringing § 1983 claims against municipalities
restrict the Washington Supreme Court in granting relief and thereby
protect against a return to the excessive judicial activism of the Lochner
era. Municipal liability, which is most often at stake in § 1983 land use
claims, can only be established through a narrow application of
Monell.2 A party can only bring an action when a constitutional right
has been violated by an official policy or custom.1 6 This means that the
challenged policy may not be set by a low-level employee, but rather
must be made by the final decisionmaker and that decisionmaker must
have selected a course of action from multiple alternatives. 7 The
Washington Supreme Court reiterated its adherence to this test in

224. Justice Talmadge alleges that Mission Springs threatens a return to Lochner. See Talmadge,
supranote 124, at 894-901.
225. See supranotes 25-34 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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Lutheran Day Care.22 Before a court applies due process analysis, a
party must overcome these hurdles, and, as a result, courts recognize
protections that ensure that local governments cannot be held liable for
every and any act under § 1983. The Lochner era is characterized by the
unbridled discretion of the judiciary; in § 1983 litigation, the United
States Supreme Court has created safeguards to prevent courts from
returning to the excesses of that era.'29
3.

ProceduralDue ProcessIs Open to Criticism,but It Is the Proper
Doctrinefor Executive DecisionmakingCases

Theoretically, procedural due process is subject to some of the same
criticisms as substantive due process. Local ordinances could be so broad
that the reviewing court could decree at its whim whether the local
decisionmaking body applied them correctly. In that situation, procedural
due process would allow courts to haphazardly strike down individual
land use decisions. This situation, though problematic, is not a return to
Lochner. Lochner dealt with constitutional separation of power
problems."0 In striking down individual land use decisions, courts are
not interfering in the realm of the legislature, but rather are reviewing
decisions that are judicial in nature, which is an entirely appropriate role
for courts.
Nonetheless, providing procedural due process rights to aggrieved
land use applicants is the proper way to expand what is currently a form
of substantive due process in Washington land use. The United States
Supreme Court allows procedural due process to be molded to every area
of law."1 Justice Frankfurter stated that "[d]ue process is perhaps the
most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system. While it
contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice,
it is also a living principle not confined to past instances." 2 2 As noted by
the Harvard Law Review, procedural due process in land use hearings
228. See supranotes 143-148 and accompanying text.
229. Any constitutional claim can be brought under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707-10 (1999) (analyzing
application of § 1983 to constitutional claims). Thus, these protections apply to all constitutional
claims, not only those involving procedural due process.
230. See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
231. See supranotes 56-61 and accompanying text.
232. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (1951).
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should require the right to notice, a hearing, and an impartial
decisionmaker that renders its decision with reference to articulable
standards. 33 Cases such as Mission Springs currently enforce these
safeguards through substantive due process and not procedural due
process. The Washington Supreme Court should modify its jurisprudence
to disentangle the two types of due process. Not only would the
Washington Supreme Court be consistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent, it would remain intellectually honest by applying the
proper doctrine and it would encourage lower courts to utilize
constitutional claims in land use because there would no longer be a
substantive due process stigma attached to their decisions. z2 4
V.

CONCLUSION

Mission Springs and other executive decisionmaking cases do not
represent claims in land use law that are out of control; rather, their
version of due process applies only in those instances where local
government violates its own regulations. Because no distinction has been
made between the two types of due process in Washington land use
cases, Washington law would benefit from the emergence of procedural
due process in § 1983 claims. Procedural due process would not be open
to the attack that the court is returning to Lochner, because it is only
utilized in those instances where the final policy maker fails to abide by
its own code. When procedural due process is recognized as distinct from
Lochner-style judicial excess, it will find greater acceptance in the legal
community.

233. Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 56, at 1502; see also supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
234. There is only one published case in which the court based its decision on the holding of
Mission Springs. Brower v. Pierce County, 96 Wash. App. 559,564-65, 984 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1999)
(holding that Mission Springs is not applicable when permit has not vested). Considering that
Mission Springs was decided more than three years ago, its application has not been widespread.

